

# PMU Data Anomaly Detection, Classification, and Prediction Using Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence

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# Power Grid Threats Growing

## NORTHEAST, 8/14/03

- High temp + untrimmed trees + deficiency of situational-awareness
- ~10 million people
- 2 weeks
- 265 plants, 80% NYISO load

## UK, 08/09/2019 <sup>[1]</sup>

- 1 gas plant + 1 offshore wind plant
- Airports, railway service, hospitals, etc.
- 1.1 million people
- 15 min, 1 hr

## PUERTO RICO, 9/20/17

- Hurricane Maria
- Entire island
- 50% restored after 3 mos.

## IRAN, 2010

- ICS PLC manipulation
- Stuxnet
- 1/5 nuclear centrifuges

## UKRAINE

### 12/23/2015 <sup>[2]</sup>

- Penetration + manual attack
- Black Energy 3
- 6-mo. reconnaissance
- 225,000 people
- 7 110kV + 23 35kV, 3hrs

### 12/17/2016 <sup>[3]</sup>

- Automated attack
- Crash override
- 1 transmission substation
- 1/5 of total grid capacity, 1hr

“It’s this modern electric power system that drives our digital economy and elevates our health, safety, and national security. Threats to our energy infrastructure, from **extreme weather events** to **cyber and physical attacks**, continue to grow and evolve.”

- DOE OE RFI



## PMU-Based Data Analytics Using Digital Twin and PhasorAnalytics Software

- DOE Award Number: *DE-OE0000915*
- FOA 1861
- Lead: GE Global Research
- Partner(s): GE Grid Software Solutions



### **Context:**

DOE has provided exclusive access to 2 years' worth of raw synchrophasor data from 100s of PMUs in the Eastern, Western, and Texas interconnections, as well as event logs with 1000s of labeled events.


### **Objectives:**

- Identifying signatures for events and anomalies.
- Identifying precursor conditions to equipment failure.
- Comprehensive data quality assessment.



# WAMS Anomaly Analytics Framework

## Holistic Anomaly Management



- PMU
- Voltage
- Current
- Angle
- Frequency
- SCADA data
- Event logs
- State estimates

Data

(System Info)

- PMU Locations
- Weather Data
- Radiation
- Air temperature
- Relative humidity
- Wind speed
- precipitation
- Others

- SVD
- PCA
- Hankel Structure


- Normalization
- Filtering
- Mapping to image

Unsupervised Learning using GE's signature base

- SVD-Based
- Hankel structured

Semi-Supervised Learning and Root Cause Analysis

- RBF
- SVM
- DT
- CNN
- RNN
- LSTM



Data Quality Handling


Data Preprocess

Disturbance Detection

Disturbance Classification


Causal/correlated factors analysis

### SVD + Power Systems Analysis



### Rapid Detection and Classification:

Feature











Examples of physical anomalies:

- Generator
- Transformer
- Line fault
- Line Lightning
- Oscillation

Examples of cyber anomalies:

- Data spoofing
- Replay Attack
- Denial of Service
- Packet Analysis



**Generator Event****Line Fault Event****Oscillation Event****Two Dominant Features:**

**Some of the most dominant features for different type of anomalies:**

**Generator events:**

- im\_std
- f\_diff\_dn
- im\_RP
- im\_diff\_dn
- f\_filter\_p2p

**Oscillation events:**

- p\_diff\_dn
- vm\_diff\_dn
- vm\_p2p
- im\_diff\_dn
- vm\_step\_mag

**Transformer events:**

- vm\_diff\_up
- vm\_diff\_dn
- p\_diff\_up
- vm\_p2p
- im\_diff\_dn

**Line events:**

- vm\_diff\_dn
- vm\_diff\_up
- vm\_p2p
- vm\_step\_mag\_1
- vm\_step\_mag\_2

- Useful signatures have been obtained for key grid events by generating and ranking an overabundance of (70+) features across two years of data from hundreds of PMUs.
- Using Eastern interconnection historical WAMS data for anomaly detection

Feature function category	Description of feature function category	Example feature functions
Fundamental feature functions	A set of basic statistics & physics-based features that may be considered applicable to most or all events and all PMU variables (frequency, ROCOF, positive sequence voltage/current mag. and angle, etc.)	Deviation from nominal value, accumulated deviation, max change, max rate of change, peak-to-peak, slope
Event-specific feature functions	Physics-based features expected to be most impactful/insightful when applied to specific events such as a generator trip, line fault, equipment failure or FIDVR; applicable to specific PMU variables.	Bump/dip area, 'n' largest step-changes, SNR or NSR
Frequency-domain feature functions	A set of features that involve modal and/or spectral analysis.	Ring-down damping and mode, energy-based ringdown event detection, zero crossing count, FFT

Max step-down  
Freq. in a rolling  
window


Diff max and min within a  
pre-processing rolling  
window




# Causal Sequences:

Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) of voltage signals:




- Transformers failure
- Useful for understanding the network structure
- Deriving causality model



Distribution of variance of SNR over a 20-minute window for event data and normal data





## Early Warning Prediction...




# Comprehensive Data Quality Assessment



## Interconnect A:



## Interconnect B:



## Interconnect C:



- 1: # of rows with 'status' !=0
- 2: # of rows with >0 'unreasonable' values\*
- 3: # of rows with >0 non-numerical values
- 4: # of rows with >0 missing values\*

Easy to  
detect/  
mitigate

\*Rows containing missing & 'unreasonable' values overlap.

25%-50% of each dataset is bad data of type 1-4; also encountered other examples of bad data (e.g. intermittent 1000x drops in voltage magnitude) that are much harder to detect and mitigate.





## Software Implementation

- Study of features from archived data:
  - Python-based custom calculations module in offline tool
  - Plan to add more ready-to-use signatures for study of archived data
- Real-time and offline Event detection and classification :
  - Currently implemented: Limited number of features are already implemented.
  - Future plan: Covering more features for different type of event

## Challenges:

- Inaccurately or inadequately labeled abnormal data
- Computational burden of pre-processing and feature generation
- Insufficient good quality data or event logs
- Anonymization of dataset to protect the identity of the data providers (no network topology, PMU location, or event location information given by the utilities, ISOs, etc.)
- ...

